Abstract. We describe a semantics for answer literals that is not tied to the specific details of the resolution proof procedure. We also describe a number of applications of answer literals to mathematical theorem proving.
Introduction
The use of answer literals is well known in resolution. It was introduced in the 1960s by Green [4] and is now discussed in many texts on automated reasoning [2, 12] and on AI. This technique is usually presented as a trick for keeping track of the variable bindings, thus simulating in a general resolution framework what Prolog would do with Horn clauses. For example, consider
Dl.p(a,b) D2. p(b, c) D3. gp(x,z) V ~p(x,y) V ~p(y,z) Q1. ~gp(x, z) v ANS(x, z)
We may think of D1, D2, D3 as the database; D1, D2 axiomatize the parenthood relation, and D3 is an axiom about grandparenthood. The clause Q1 can be viewed as the negation of a theorem (or query), 3xz gp (x, z) . If this negation is expressed simply as the clause ~gp(x, z), resolution will derive the empty clause, proving the theorem, but not actually producing an explicit x, z satisfying gp(x, z). Instead, we feed clause Q1 to the resolution prover, deriving ANS(a, c), meaning that in the course of the deduction, x got bound to a and z got bound to c, so gp(a, c) holds.
Here, since all the clauses are Horn clauses, this particular example has an obvious translation into Prolog syntax. Non-Horn examples may produce disjunctive answers. For example, if we replaced D1 by p(al, b)Vp(a2, b), then we could derive ANS(al, c) V ANS(a2, c), but we could not derive either ANS (al, c) or 
ANS(a2, c).
A completely different application with exactly the same semantics comes from reasoning about exceptions, as in the following famous example: we may also say that 3xy exception(x, y) is a logical consequence of R1, R2, R3, F1, F2. Then, reinserting the ANS literal, we compute which rule got broken. Again, we get a disjunctive answer: ANS(tweety, rl) V ANS(tweety, r3). Now, the answer literal technique can be used with other resolution-based methods, such as paramodulation. Some less trivial mathematical examples will be given in Sections 3 and 4, but a simple illustration is
Here, the database, D1, D2, axiomatizes some simple facts about the integers, where h(x) denotes the largest integer ~< x/2. The two query clauses come from the one theorem, Vy3x(2. x = y V2.x = y + 1), but we want not only to prove the theorem, but also to retrieve x as an explicit function of y. Negating the theorem in the standard way, we replace y by a Skolem constant c, and the negated 3x becomes a Vx, but then we insert an ANS disjunct, obtaining Vx(-~(2.x = cV2.x = c+ 1) VANS(x)), which becomes the clauses Q1, Q2. Feeding this to a resolution prover, such as McCune's system OTTER [8] , we quickly obtain 
h(c +
1
ANS(h(c + 1)) (binary, 3, Q1)
Presumably, this derivation proves Vy(2. h(y + 1) = y V 2-h(y + 1) = y + 1).
As we see, when the query is converted to clauses, the answer literal may appear several times in the resolution input. Because of this, and because of the introduction of Skolem constants and functions, one may begin to wonder exactly what the results of such derivations really say about solutions to the original query.
Discussions in the literature [2, 4, 7] of the theory of answer literals are very much tied to the procedural details of the resolution format. They are also based on Herbrand models, so it is not clear how these discussions apply in the presence of equality. They also assume that the ANS appears in only one clause.
In Section 2, we give a simple semantic explanation of the answer literal method that is not tied to resolution at all. Thus, answer literals could just as well be used with any other proof procedure, such as tableau-based systems, which have been advocated [3] as an alternative to resolution.
The specifics of the deductive system come in only when we consider the issues of soundness and completeness. Completeness sometimes leads to tricky theoretical problems, since many of the known 'completeness' results about resolution-based systems really only establish refutation completeness -that is, the empty cause will be derived if the input clauses are inconsistent; this does not necessarily imply that every answer clause ANS(T) that follows from the axioms will be derived. As usual, soundness questions are easier, but even here we must be careful to distinguish between soundness and refutation soundness. These issues are also covered in Section 2.
In Sections 3 and 4, we illustrate the abstract discussion in Section 2 with two classes of examples obtained using OTIER.
The first class, covered in Section 3, is, perhaps, obvious -one can solve an equation. That is, we prove from some algebraic theory that a solution exists, and we use the answer literal to retrieve the solution. Simple examples of this kind occur in the text of Chang and Lee [2] . More sophisticated examples from combinatory logic occur in [12] (see Section 10.6). We give two examples. In the first, we show how to use OTTER to produce all answers to a given problem.
The second illustrates the interpretation of Skolem functions occurring in the solution.
In the second class, covered in Section 4, we solve an inequation. This is of interest when we are trying to pin down which instances of a rule are needed to prove a given fact. For example, it is well known that a semigroup (associative structure) with an identity e satisfying Vx(x 2 = e) must be a group (obviously) and must also be commutative. But, to prove ab = ba, exactly which squares do we need to be the identity? Or, turning this around, if we have ab ~ ha, then there is some element whose square is not the identity. What is it? Formally, from the axiom ab ~ ba, we are proving the solvability of an inequation, 3x(x 2 ~ e), and we are using the answer literal to find a solution. Or, using the terminology of the all-birds-can-fly example, assuming a failure of commutativity, we are pinning down an exception to the 'rule' Vx(x 2 = e).
We discuss this example in more detail in Section 4 and then give a more complicated example related to the Robbins algebra problem.
Semantics
In this section, our basic results involve purely semantic notions of logical consequence -not any particular proof theory. We presume some standard presentation of first-order logic. In particular, we shall use/2 for our vocabulary -that is, the set of all function, predicate, and constant symbols. A sentence is a logical formula with no free variables. If ~b is any formula, let V~b be its universal closure.
An ~2-structure, 92~, consists of a nonempty domain of discourse, M, together with an assignment of a suitable semantic entity, s ~, for each symbol s E E. In the case that /2 includes the symbol '=', we shall always assume that 9~ interprets '=' as true identity on M. If ~b is a sentence of s then 9Jr ~ q5 means that ~b is true in 99I. If I3 is a set of sentences of/2, then 9)'t ~ P~ means that 9Jr ~ ~b for each ~b E ~. If ~b is another sentence of 12, then ~ ~ ~b means that for all/;-structures 93I, if 9Yt ~ ~, then 93I ~ ~b. Yl, is inconsistent iff there is no 93I at all such that 93I ~ N. So, N ~ ~b if and only if N U {--,~b} is inconsistent. Now, suppose that ~b is a sentence of the form Hx~b(x). Here, x denotes some n-tuple of variables, so that ~b is really of the form qZl,... ,znqb(Zl,... ,zn), where ~b is a formula with at most Zl,..., zn free. Then, in an attempt to establish ~ ~ ~p, we would normally add Vx(--,~b(x)) to E, but instead we add Vx(--,~b(x) V ANS(x)). Part (1) of the next theorem says that we will never derive a contradiction unless N itself is inconsistent, and part (2) gives the semantic meaning to an ANS assertion being derived.
THEOREM 1. Suppose ~ is a set of sentences of E and 3xq~(x) is a sentence of E, where x denotes an n-tuple of variables. Let ANS be an n-place predicate symbol not in s let/2' be E U { A N S }, and let ~' be ~ tO { Vx (-~qb ( x ) V A N S ( x ) ) }. Then

~ is inconsistent iff ~ is inconsistent. 2. If for i = 1,..., k, each ri is an n-tuple of terms of E, then ~' ~ V(ANS('rl) V... V ANS('rk)) (a)
if and only if
Proof For (1), one way is trivial, since E C Et. Conversely, if E is consistent, let 97/~ 13, where 93t is an E-structure. So, 93I does not assign a meaning to ANS. We may expand 9Yt to an s structure by declaring ANS ~' to be universally true; 9~t and 9W have the same domains of discourse and agree on their interpretation of all symbols other than ANS. Then, 9"Jr ~ ~ 13', so E~ is consistent.
For (2), also, (a) is immediate from (b), since E ~ is equivalent to E together with Vx(r ANS(x)). Conversely, if (b) fails, let 93t be a model of E in which the sentence V(r V r is false. Expand 99t to an E' structure by declaring ANS ~' to be true exactly where r is, so that 93t ~ Vx(r ANS(x)). Then 99t is a model for E' in which V(ANS ('rl 
[] Note that we are assuming nothing about the logical complexity of E or r Thus, it is quite possible that E ~ 3xr without there being any sequence of terms "rz as in (b). For example, suppose r is Vy(p(x) V ~p(y)). Then 3xr is logically valid, and hence follows from 0, but there are no r~ such that 0 ~ V(r V... V r ). Now, the input to a resolution prover is quantifier-free, with univeral quantification of the variables implicitly understood. For such inputs, Herbrand's theorem implies immediately the following. However, if the "r~ contain only Skolem functions arising from E, this may impart some interesting information, since we then know that the answer is valid regardless of the choice of the Skolem functions. A concrete example where this is useful is given in Section 3.
THEOREM 2 (Herbrand
Finally, Skolem constants will come in if we wish to prove Vw3xr x), and see explicitly how x depends on w. We introduce a tuple of Skolem constants, c, for the w. Rather than just deriving a contradiction from Vx--,r x), we instead reason from Vx(-~r x) V ANS(x)). The T~ appearing in the answer literals may then involve c. In addition, the ri may involve some tuple of other variables, which get universally quantified as before. We may then apply the following: So far, we have just discussed semantics. If we fix a specific proof theory, we may address problems of soundness and completeness. We have no new results here, but just point out that care must be taken when applying known results -especially concerning completeness, where the literature often blurs the distinction between completeness and refutation completeness. Let us assume that we have a definition of provability, t-. The underlying syntax need not be full first-order logic (for example, it may deal only with clauses), but we assume it always has some syntactic entity, [2, which is always false (e.g., the empty clause in resolution, or any qa A --,~ in standard predicate logic).
DEFINITION. t-is fully complete (or, just complete) iff (E ~ X)implies(E t-X)
holds for each E and X.
F-is refutation complete iff (1) holds whenever X is [2.
(1)
DEFINITION. ~ is fully sound (or, just sound) iff (E l-X)implies(E ~ X)
~-is refutation sound iff (2) holds whenever X is [3.
Now, all the standard resolution techniques (binary resolution, paramodulation, etc.) are fully sound, so that, assuming the implementation is correct, if a resolution prover says that E F-X, one may conclude that E ~ X and then apply the semantic results (Theorem 2.1 or Theorem 2.4). The only case where full soundness fails is in the Skolemization step, which, if it is automated by the theorem prover (as does OTTER [8] if the user requests it), might be considered to be part of the deductive process. This stepis refutation sound but not fully sound. That is, if the system Skolemizes E to E and then derives X, which depends on the Skolem functions, one cannot conclude that E ~ X, but only that E ~ X. For completeness, the problem is somewhat trickier. There are many completeness results in the literature for various combinations of resolution-based techniques, but these results usually derive refutation completeness, not full completeness. Even very simple resolution techniques fail to be fully complete; for example, the clause p V q is not provable from p by binary resolution. In some cases, the lifting property plus refutation completeness is sufficient to prove that all answers will be found. That is, we may delete the ANS literals, find a proof of the empty clause, and then insert the ANS literals back in again. This examination of the proof structure is the content of the arguments in [4, 7] .
Of course, one must be careful that the rules are phrased so that reinserting the ANS literal results in a legitimate proof. For example, in negative hyperresolution, it is important that, as does OTI'ER, we ignore the ANS literals when deciding whether a clause is negative. Say we start with the three clauses -~p(a),
q(a), and p(x) V ~q(x) V ANS(x). The first step must derive ~q(a) V ANS(a),
and the prover must view this as a negative clause. With equality, many of the combinations with paramodulation do not satisfy the lifing property, and we cannot in general guarantee that all the answers get computed. For example, paramodulation plus binary resolution plus factoring is refutation complete whenever the input clauses contain x = x. If we start with x ----x, a = b, and (x ~ y) V ANS(x, y), we will derive ANS(x, x) and ANS(a, b), but not ANS (f(a), f(b) ), even though this is a correct answer and is not subsumed by the other two. We do not know whether there is a theorem to the effect that the answer literal method is complete in all "mathematically interesting" cases.
In practice, soundness is usually more important than completeness, since many resolution runs include some bound to clause or term size, which invalidates completeness anyway. However, occasionally (see, e.g., Lemma 2.3 of [6] ), the completeness of the Knuth-Bendix procedure is taken as a proof of nonprovability (that is, of the existence of a countermodel). The next section contains an example using the Knuth-Bendix procedure to compute all possible answers; although we do not have any general completeness result involving answer literals, we shall present an argument that covers that specific example.
Algebraic Equations
We work two examples here. The first involves solving an equation in a group. The second involves Moufang loops and illustrates an example where the Skolem functions arise in the axioms.
For the first example, say we are in a group, with identity e, and suppose the group has exponent 3 (that is, x 3 = e for all x). What are the solutions to the equation axb = bxa? The natural OTTER input file here is assign(max_proofs, 40). % find 40 answers, if you can op(400, xfy, *).
% right associate set(knuth_bendix). list(sos).
(x * y) * z = x * (y * z). % associativity % exp 3 groups:
x * (x * x) = e. (x * x) * x = e. e*x=x. and derived ANS(ba), which means we have shown as a theorem of ~ that 1. In any group of exponent 3, each of these 9 is a solution to axb = bxa. 2. In F(a, b), these 9 are distinct. 3. In F(a, b) , every solution to axb = bxa is one of these 9. Thus, no product involving a and b, other than the 9 listed, could represent a different solution in all groups of exponent 3. Our claim is not based on any abstract completeness theorem (which, as pointed out in Section 2, we do not have), but rather on the fact that in this particular instance, we have forced OTTER to enumerate all of F(a, b) .
The second example comes from Moufang loops. Consider the language to be 12 = {.}. A loop is a structure with a left and right identity in which the maps x ~ a* x and x ~ x 9 a are bijections for each a. In the 1930s, Moufang studied loops satisfying the following three Moufang identities:
By the 1950s, Brock and others (see [1] ) had shown that these identities are actually equivalent in loops, a fact that is now trivial to derive in OTTER. See Wos [1 l] for more on OTTER derivations involving these identities. Note that an associative loop is a group, and in a group, the Moufang identities are trivial consequences of the associative law. The axioms (M1)-(M3) alone do not imply the structure is a loop and, in fact, probably have no interesting consequences at all, since they are valid in any model of Vxy(x 9 y = y). However, now consider adding the additional axiom
Vxy3z(x * (z 9 x) = y).
(A) (A) plus (M1)-(M3) does imply that the structure is a loop. To prove this, Skolemize (A) to x. (f(x, y).x) = y; it is not clear yet whether the z in (A) is determined uniquely from x, y (although this will follow once we prove the structure is a loop). As a first step in investigating the subject, we tried to prove that there is a right identity, 3uVx(x 9 u = x), and obtain an explicit expression for the identity. Following the usual procedure, we tried to derive a contradiction from Vu(~Vx(x 9 u = x) V ANS(u)). To feed this to OTTER, we Skolemized it to h(u) 9 u ~ h(u) V ANS(u) and then tried to derive an expression of the form ANS(T). If r involved the Skolem function h, we could say nothing, as pointed out in Section 2, but in fact the answers obtained involved only f, not h, so they did yield some information. The input file was assign(max_weight, 40). op(400, xfx, *) . % don't associate assign(max_proofs, i0). set(knuth_bendix). list(sos).
% Moufang identities: Now that we know this answer, it is easy to check by hand that it is best possible -that is, even in groups, no two of a 2 = e, b 2 = e, (ab) 2 = e imply that ab = ba.
A less elementary example involves Robbins algebras; this topic is discussed in some detail in the text of Wos, Overbeek, Lusk, and Boyle [12] . In a Boolean algebra, we may consider OR and NOT to be basic, with the other Boolean operations defined from them. It is easy to see that the following four equations are valid in every Boolean algebra (we are using o for OR and n for NOT):
In 1933, Huntington [5] showed that in fact (A), (C), and (H) together imply all equations valid in Boolean algebras. Somewhat later, Robbins formulated (R). Let us call a Robbins algebra any system satisfying (A), (C), and (R). The Robbins algebra problem, whether every Robbins algebra must be Boolean, is still open.
The attacks on this problem have been mainly to study the properties of a non-Boolean Robbins algebra, in the hope either of deriving a contradiction or of learning enough about the structure to conjecture a model. Some things are easy to see by hand. Let ,4 be a Robbins algebra. Axiom (R) implies immediately that the n function maps A onto A. Now replacing y by n(y) in (R) yields n(n(x o n(y)) o n(n(x) o n(y))) = n(y). If n is a 1-1 map, we could delete the outermost n on both sides, obtaining n(x o n(y)) o n(n(x) o n(y)) = y, which is axiom (H), so the algebra is Boolean. That is, in a non-Boolean Robbins algebra, the map n is onto but not l-l, which implies that ,4 is infinite.
A much deeper result is due to Winker [9, 10] , who showed that every nonBoolean Robbins algebra must satisfy the inequalities VxVy(x o y # x) and VxVy(n(x o y) # n(x)). Using this, one may derive other structural properties of these algebras. For example, it is clear that in a non-Boolean Robbins algebra, (H) must fail somewhere; but where, exactly?
The natural way to answer this is to run OTTER with the following source file, which finishes in a few seconds:
op(400, xfy, o). assign(max_proofs, 4). The third proof yields Sans (v65 o n (v65 o v64) , v64), which means that axiom (H) is false for x, y whenever x is of the form z o n(z o y). Thus, we know more than just the fact that n is not 1-1, which asserts merely 3y3u(u g&n(u) = n(g)). Rather, we have Vy3u(u r y&n(u) = n(y)). Namely, for any g, z, if we set
u = n(z o n(z o y) o n(y)) o n(n(z o n(z o y)) o n(y)),
then, as we have just shown, u -r y, whereas by (R), n(u) = n(y).
